![]() ![]() With our expensive platforms, specialised systems and ‘just in time’ supply chains, Western nations have become good at designing forces around things going right. Adaption is a principle of war, but we don’t select for it in recruiting or training to develop it specifically. Yet, despite its importance, it is not prioritised. From Corelli Barnett’s Audit of War to Andrew Krepinevich’s The Army and Vietnam, military history has highlighted the failure to adapt as a critical failure. Adaptation, not optimisationĬhange in conflict is the nature of war. The real issue is resisting the siren call of certainty. Arguing over expeditionary versus warfighting forces or drones instead of armour is a distraction. We risk optimising for the war we want instead of the war we will have to fight. Our conceptual thinking about war and conflict must move away from institutional arrogance and insisting we can predict and bring order to something that is inherently chaotic and complex. This article proposes putting the primacy of adaptation at the centre of British military thinking. This problem is not new but technological acceleration is making it starker. The adaptation of militaries to change is historically erratic and, during peacetime, is impacted by multiple variables outside normal control. The evolutionary pressure of conflict requires armed forces to optimise. This affects not just when we fight but, more importantly, how we fight. Disorder is the defining feature of our era. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
Details
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |